

DARSHAN


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Editorial:

Freedom of Speech



Belief in the right to think and express one's ideas freely and faith in intelligence are means of improving conditions of individual and society. When asked if one believes in freedom of speech, the answer most likely to be that, one believes in freedom to express freely one's view. These expressions must be right and true, if they are to be counted as important. Freedom of speech means the right of an individual to think properly and to speak out on any issue without fear and interference. Freedom of expression is a prime factor for the advancement of a society and its members. If a person cannot think and express his or her thoughts and ideas freely the development of individual and society will be arrested. Such a situation will be very detrimental to any society. Qualities like self-consciousness, ethical approach, aesthetic sense and equivalent mental traits can flourish when men and women express their thoughts and ideas without any hindrance.

Situation today, so far as freedom of thought, speech and expressions are concerned, is not at all conducive. Our freedom of speech is not granted in the proper sense of the term and if granted not awarded the proper due. In such a situation we cannot say that we are free to give expressions to our ideas. When criticisms are not granted and citizen's point of view is not considered, it leads to a situation where general interest and welfare is hampered. In such a situation irresponsible power tends to be used in the interest group that creates, controls power. The democratic ideal involves talking things out rather than fighting them out. Let reason, discussion and experimentation combat error.

Education and democracy mean a little unless they are accompanied by freedom of thought and right to give expression to the best that every individual has. Each person has an obligation to use his/ her intelligence in ways which further his /her development and that of the society.

Sangita Baruah

Philosophy of Swami Vivekananda

Dr. Jyotsna Bhattacharjee

Swami Vivekananda was born on 12, 1863, in a prosperous family in Kolkata. Initially his name was Narendra, but later on he came to be known as Vivekananda. His early life was not eventful. Since early childhood, he was interested in physical culture and intellectual pursuits. He became proficient not only in literature and music, but also in riding, swimming and wrestling. He deeply studied the ancient Indian scriptures and learnt about the traditional Indian Philosophy. He also studied western literature. At the outset, his mental disposition was that of a skeptic and a rationalist, combined onto one. Consequently he was a kind of atheist.

In 1881, Narendra happened to meet Swami Ramakrishna Paramhansa. This meeting proved to be a turning point in his life. At the beginning, he was rather dubious about the teaching of his master. But after a brief period of contact with Ramakrishna, all his doubts disappeared and he took Swami Ramakrishna as his friend, philosopher and guide. And after sometime, Narendra was transformed into Swami Vivekananda. Very soon he became the most trusted and favourite disciple of Ramakrishna. After the death of his master, Vivekananda took the mission of working for the welfare of the country. To get the

acquainted with the social and economic conditions of the country; he exclusively toured almost the whole of India. After visiting the various parts of the country, he realized that India, in spite of its rich spiritual and moral heritage, as well as the strong cultural history, had not been able to eradicate poverty, weakness and social evils. Hence, he thought that to remove these evils, what was needed was a spiritual revolution and for that a strong spiritual leader was needed.

At that time he came to know that a Parliament of Religions was going to be held in Chicago. He decided to go there to participate in the meeting to express the Hindu view of life. What happened there is history. He conquered the hearts of the participants from various countries with his eloquence and deep knowledge. The Parliament of Religions helped Vivekananda to assume the spiritual leadership of the Indian masses.

He travelled widely not only in India, but in foreign countries as well to learn the good things. After his returned from foreign lands, he established the Ramakrishna Ashram at Belur near Kolkata and started the work of social service and reform. He was not only a social reformer and a spiritual leader, but was a great philosopher as well.

Vivekananda's philosophy arose from the awareness of the social, religious and economic conditions of the Indian people. He believed that at least some of the evils arose due to orthodoxy, prejudice and superstitions prevalent at the time. He thought that these things happened because of the loss of faith in spiritual values. Consequently, he aimed at a spiritual awakening to attain the highest values.

Vivekananda's thoughts were greatly influenced by the ancient Hindu philosophy, especially Vedanta. It can be said that Vivekananda was chiefly a Vedantist. The main ideas of his thoughts were derived from the Hindu scriptures, especially

from the Upanishads and Vedanta. His basic belief in the unity of everything indicates the monistic nature of the reality, which actually owes its existence to Vedanta. His concept of "Maya" also derived from the same source. Then he often made a distinction between the 'empirical' and 'transcendental' point of view to solve the some apparent contradictions. Obviously this point of view was also derived from the Vedanta. It is true that he often talked about reinterpreting Vedanta according to the needs of time. Even then it is a fact that the basic ideas of his philosophy were based on Vedanta.

In a sense Vivekananda was influenced by the Buddhist philosophy as well. His philosophy contains a few ideas from the Buddhist thought. The first is the idea of mass liberation that Vivekananda contemplated. It has similarity with the Buddhist ideal of "Bodhisattava"; secondly Vivekananda was much impressed by the Buddhist assertion that the raft one uses for crossing the river in a storm should be left for the use of others. It implies that even after attaining liberation, one should work for liberation of others. Buddha himself, after attaining liberation, wandered around, helping the people in their struggle against sufferings. Vivekananda greatly appreciated such humanitarian and altruistic works.

He was influenced by Christianity to a certain extent. He was impressed by the strength of character of Jesus Christ, since it needed great spiritual strength to forgive the oppressor in the midst of the acute physical suffering. Thus from Christianity Vivekananda, took up the ideals of service and love. He was convinced that every man contains within himself an element of divinity. Then Gita's concept of "selfless work" was a source of constant inspiration to Vivekananda.

But the most profound influence on him was that of Swami Ramakrishna. It has been said that Ramakrishna brought about

a spiritual transformation in the personality and mental attitude of Vivekananda. Ramakrishna initiated him to spiritual discipline and meditation.

It is very difficult to reduce the teaching of a social reformer and religious leader to the technical mode of academic philosophy. The reasons are simple. A preacher or a religious teacher does not merely want to satisfy the intellectual curiosity of man. He also appeals to feelings and emotions of man. So he does not feel the need of observing the rules of logic. Moreover, if one is interested in the particular aspect of life, he does not bother about the discrepancies involved in the theoretical aspect. In the comprehensive attitude of a religious leader all contradictions disappear. Even then we may perhaps attempt to apply some metaphysical epithets to the philosophy of Vivekananda. His philosophy may be termed as 'idealistic'. Metaphysical idealism holds that reality is ultimately spiritual or ideal or mental in character. Then according to some idealists the ideal Reality is of the nature of 'ideas' that is, ideas of some mind, finite, infinite or ideas as such, objective and universal. Berkeley can be cited as the supporter of the first kind and Plato of the second. Berkeley believed reality to be an idea of some mind, while for Plato ideas are universal and objective. Vivekananda was not an idealist in that sense. He can be termed as idealist, because he believed in the ultimacy of certain ideal values and started that sincere and persistent attempts should be made to attain such values. His idealism therefore not unrealistic. It becomes unrealistic only when the ideal is nothing but a creation of one's imagination. But Vivekananda asserted his ideal to be capable of inspiring and attracting everyone. □

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“A Critical Study of Concept of Upamana (comparison) in Nyaya Philosophy.”

Ruma Payeng

Abstract

Epistemology is a branch of philosophy. Indian philosophy presents variety of opinion regarding the means of the cognition. Different schools recognize different number and kinds of pramnanas. The Nyaya philosophy accepts the four means of valid knowledge. According to Nyaya philosophy upamana (comparison) is the third source of valid knowledge. Upamana (comparison) is an independent source of valid knowledge according to the Nyaya philosophy. Upamana (comparison) means the knowledge of the similarity of two things. This paper aims at studying the concept of Comparison (upamana) in Nyaya philosophy and analysis how to reject the Nyaya view of upamana (comparison)?

Keywords: Pramana, Upamana, Nyaya, Knowledge.

Introduction:

Epistemology is a branch of philosophy. The Epistemology means theory of knowledge. The theory of knowledge accept both Indian philosophy and Western philosophy. In Indian philosophy there are six sources of valid knowledge namely, Perception (pratyaksa), Inference (anumana), Verbal testimony (sabda), Comparison (upamana), Postulation (Arthapatti) and Non- perception (anupalabधि). In Western philosophy there are only two sources of true knowledge namely, Reason and Experience. The Nyaya philosophy accepts four sources of valid knowledge namely, Perception (pratyaksa), Inference (anumana), Comparison (upamana) and Verbal testimony (sabda). Upamana is an independent means of knowledge in the system of Nyaya, the Puvamimamsa and the Advaita school of uttamamimamsa.

Concept of comparison (upamana) in Nyaya philosophy:

Among the four means of valid knowledge in Nyaya philosophy upamana is regarded as the third. It is derived from the word upa and mana. Upa means similarity and mana means knowledge. So the literary meaning of the word upamana is the knowledge of the similarity of two things. Upamana is commonly rendered as analogy in English. Gautama's definition of upamana is "prasiddhasadhrmayat sadhya sadhanam upamanam." Vatsyayana explains this definition of upamana as which makes known what is to be make known from similarity with an object that is already will known . According to Naiyayikas, upamana is the process of knowledge through which we come to know that a certain word denotes a certain class of objects. We have such knowledge when we are told by some authoritative person that a word denotes the a class object of a certain description and then, on the basis of

the given description, apply the word to some object or objects which fit in with that description, although we might not have seen them before. A certain villager is told by a forester that a gavaya is a wild animal that looks like a cow. The villager afterwards goes to a forest and happens to see a wild animal of that description. He perceives in the animal the similarity to a cow, remembers the words of the forester, namely that a gavaya is like a cow, and then comes to the conclusion, "The word gavaya denotes the class of objects similar to the cow." This resulting knowledge is called upamana (comparison). The grounds of our knowledge in upamana are given description of the objects to be known and a perception of their similarity, etc. to the familiar objects mentioned in the description. A man recognizes a gavaya as such just when he perceives its similarity to the cow and remembers the description, the gavaya is an animal resembling the cow.

Criticism:

According to Naiyayikas upamana (comparison) is an independent source of valid knowledge. But other systems of Indian philosophy do not accept the Nyaya view.

The Naiyayikas accept upamana (comparison) as an independent source of valid knowledge. But the Carvaka philosophy rejected the upamana (comparison) as an independent means of valid knowledge. The Carvakas contend that upamana is not a pramana at all, since it cannot give us true knowledge about the denotation of the words as maintained by the Naiyayikas.

The Buddha philosophy also rejected the upamana (comparison) as a distinct source of valid knowledge. The Buddhist logicians recognise upamana as a form of valid knowledge, but they reduce it to perception and verbal

testimony, so that we do not require a separate source of knowledge like upamana (comparison).

The Sankhya and the Vaisheshika system explain upamana (comparison) as a form of inference, and therefore, neither a distinct type of knowledge nor an independent way of knowing.

The Jaina philosophy reduces upamana (comparison) to pratyabhijna or recognition. Therefore, according to Jaina philosophy Upamana (comparison) is not a separate means of knowledge.

The Mimamsakas recognize upamana as a separate source of valid knowledge, but their account of it is different from that of Nyaya. The Naiyayikas hold that on learning from an authority that a gavaya is like a cow, a person goes to a forest, perceives some animal like the cow and then he has by upamana (comparison) the knowledge that such an animal is a gavaya. Against this Nyaya view it is pointed out by Mimamsakas writers that the knowledge that the particular animal perceived is like the cow is derived from perception and the knowledge that such an animal looking like the cow is a gavaya is obtained through recollection of what was previously learned from some authority. Lastly, the knowledge that this particular animal is a gavaya, is a mere inference from the last knowledge. Hence what the Nyaya considers to be derived from a new source, namely comparison, is not really so. Mimamsakas explain similarity cannot be called a quality (guna), because a quality cannot be possessed by another quality; but 'similarity' is possessed by qualities even. It cannot be treated as a universal (samanya or jati). Because a universal means something which is exactly identical in many individuals (e.g. cowness in cows). Similarity does not mean any completely identical character.

The Advaitins regard upamana (comparison) as a distinct method of mediate knowledge, which is unlike inference as well as perception. But Nyaya view of upamana is rejected by the Advaitins on the grounds that if it is to be maintained, we must show that we achieve through this method some knowledge which cannot be obtained through any other accepted method like testimony, inference, etc. But what information do we obtain through this method, according to the Naiyayikas? It is the knowledge that the word gavaya denotes the class of objects that are similar to the cow? Or it is the knowledge that the word gavaya connotes the universal, "gavaya-ness" (gavayatva)? If it be the first, we find that this information is already obtained from the testimony of the person who tell us what gavaya is like. If it be the second, we find that this knowledge can be derived through an inference like "The word gavaya possesses a connotation (i.e. gavayatva), because it is a word like a 'jar', 'cloth', etc. which have the connotations." It is found, therefore, that the object which the Nyaya upamana seeks to attain is easily obtained through either through testimony or through inference.

The Advaita Vedanta explain upamana (comparison) as a means of the knowledge of similarity is also used to communicate the nature of atman and Brahman. Atman (supreme self) is said to be all-pervading and unrelated like akasa, so that by reflecting on these characteristics of akasa, the seeker can form an idea of the nature of the supreme self. Brahman is said to be resplendent as the sun, so that by perceiving the luminosity of the sun, the seeker can conceive the self-luminosity of Brahman. □

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Problem of life, Existence and Knowing thyself:

Pranjal Changkakoti

I

When we say that we know something, it means that we have an acquaintance with an object of knowledge. And we know an object with certainty and truly if the object is analyzed scientifically and properly. But a question arises why we have needed the knowledge of a particular thing? Do we have any problem if we don't know the object? In answer, we can say that when we take step in our life, everyone has to be related with some facts or objects and that's why we have needed to know the particular thing, for as much those are very familiar with our practical life and we can expect a good impact from those when we will understand the nature and reality of those things. We never kick a big stone in the playground; we only play with a football made by tube and leather. Because we know very well about the nature of stone and its use and needs which is certainly distinct from football. So, we are not confused about the nature of stone when we raise the questions of problems of life, mind and thought and ignorance, it appears that we are not able to

perceive our self knowledge, we don't know what is happening in our mind? Whether the ideas that are coming to our mind, are correct or not? Whether they are real, practical, emotional or something else? What we think about a particular fact, how much we are able to understand the fact? Many a times we have no proper answer about these questions, because we are never conscious about these. If we want a scientific way of life, if we expect a healthy, happy and a moral life, we must be conscious about the thoughts or mental state of ourselves. In this regard, we can remember a great comment "Know thyself" propounded by Socrates, the great Greek philosopher and the Upanishads in the eastern philosophy.

II

Problems are not the prohibition of life, problems are just a fact that arises from different causes. But we have some expectations with our emotions. So we cry when a familiar person dies, and keep smiling in the case of new born infant. But what is the real world and how can realize the world what we perceive? The Vedantic philosophy states 'know the Brahman or soul what is real and absolute' and if one realize the reality then he will be free from the worldly attachment or desire. It means that reality sometimes cannot be directly perceived in the perceptual world. When the question of the object of existence is raised, it is considered the soul as a real existence beyond the physical body and as well as we also tries to understand the value of physical existence in the empirical world. In the same way, our sensation perceive some facts and collect some data or information from the empirical world, worldly objects and practical life, it is just a cognitive nature, where we get some ideas. But problem arises from the affective nature, if we disregard to apprehend the truthness of these ideas and is accepted all as a true and factual as coming

to our mind, that is the problem of our mind and thinking.

III

Every individual have a uniqueness and has a unique nature, unique ideal and unique perspective of life and world. Similarly education, family or social customs or principle cannot exclude this uniqueness which is reflected unknowingly in the thoughts, behaviour, body language and life style in our practical life. So, the distinctness of individuals are not only in having appearance, but having in nature and thoughts. Before knowing the material world and object, at first we have to know about ourselves, 'what about thought and ideology having in my mind? Why do I think about them? Is it external impact or my individual rational thought or judgement? How can I fulfill my thought? What I think for doing?' This is the main problem of life, for as much as we don't think about ourselves, but we only think that we perceive. Thus, one can define his own individual unique nature by knowing how does he or she is distinct from another, how does he or she is related with the empirical world and immediately he will be able to find out the practical way of life which is defined as svadharna in the Vedic philosophy. Regarding the svadharna (practical way of life), Vedic philosophy hints that a saint can never be confused by perceiving a delicious life of a king. Hence, through the self analysis, one can know his own individual existence, and can find out the needs of his own life. There are two things...needs and desire which always confuses the general people. What are needs? Needs are necessary objects or things. But desires are the attachment, greed without which we can move. We can fulfill our needs in a particular stage or time, but no one can be able to fulfill his desire, because it has no ending in our material world, one desire creates an another desire, the second also produces the third and in this way it

continues. It is one of the reasons of dissatisfaction of human life. Every individual has his own ideal, individual perspective to live and hence only he or she can define the needs for his or her ownself. Not only needs, but also everyone can define himself, know himself and can realize his uniqueness in the journey of life and that is the real existence of an individual.

IV

Somehow, we are not concerned about the relational existence of our own self. At first, it is the relation of mind and body, which can be defined as internal relation. Secondly, the external relations, e.g., individual and family relation and individual and social relations. In the internal relation, we always ignore the mental aspect and always emphasized on the body. If we injure in a part of the body it physically hurt us and in the same way our mind is a subtle organ, which has a great impact from the relational empirical world. Since, if an individual think about a legal proper and healthy life, he must be alert about the healthy body and at the same time a healthy mind, and he should actively analyze every thoughts and ideas coming to his mind and after that he can define them how he will accept the ideas or thoughts. It determines the mental states of life. The material objects, social relations create some wrong ideas and we accept them without the proper analysis and reason, and slowly our mind moves towards an evil direction. So we have the need of a proper scientific analysis of every thought and ideas coming to our mind. If someone asks, from which point the life starts? In answer, we can say that it starts with thought. Thought is the highest activity of the human life. Every physical activity is directed by our thought, means that at first we think and afterwards we do with physical movement. One's ideology, one's personality or individuality is nothing, but it is only the thoughts having in his mind. In

every movement, different thoughts are coming to our mind but we are not alert, whether they are necessary or not, whether they lay ignorant or give knowledge. They are all the cause of our mental structure. If we are not conscious about what the ideas or thoughts in our mind, how can we say whether we are right or wrong! It means that we don't know ourselves, we don't know what we think, what we say or what we do. This is the main problem of life.

V

Every human being has an individual reality but has to live with some external relations, e.g. relation with the family, society etc. It is not only an external relation, it is a responsibility, duty, and a great part of life. Every relation is conditional but every condition is real. One must realize his relation and responsibility by identifying himself as a unique and distinct body. Two friends may be more close and familiar, but they are not one, but it is not an unpleasant matter, it is fact and real. Hence, one should realize the distinctness of own self from the others and at the same time the responsibility and the degree of the relations. This is called the humanity, that leads to perform the responsibility for the others having the individual identity. The journey of life is not lonely, but only the steps are lonely. Every step moves towards the future with the distinctive individual energy and also earns some new spirit from each step and take steps for the further movement. This is the movement of life with a conscious mind by knowing thyself and it is the perfect direction of human existence. □

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Buddha And Buddhism

Jayanta Baruah

Buddhism is one of the major religions in the world. It began around 2,500 years ago in India when Siddhartha Gautama discovered how to bring happiness into the world. He was born around 566 BC, in the small kingdom of Kapilavastu. His father was King Suddhodana and his mother was Queen Maya. Soon after Prince Siddhartha was born, the wise men predicted that he would become a Buddha. When the king heard this, he was deeply disturbed, for he wanted his son to become a mighty ruler. He told Queen Maya, "I will make life in the palace so pleasant that our son will never want to leave."

At the age of sixteen, Prince Siddhartha married a beautiful princess, Yasodhara. The king built them three palaces, one for each season, and lavished them with luxuries. They passed their days in enjoyment and never thought about life outside the palace. Soon Siddhartha became disillusioned with the palace life and wanted to see the outside world. He made four trips outside the palace and saw four things that changed his life. On the first three trips, he saw sickness, old age and death.

He asked himself, "How can I enjoy a life of pleasure when there is so much suffering in the world?"

On his fourth trip, he saw a wandering monk who had given up everything he owned to seek an end to suffering. "I shall be like him," Siddhartha thought. Leaving his kingdom and loved ones behind, Siddhartha became a wandering monk. He cut off his hair to show that he had renounced the worldly lifestyle and called himself Gautama. He wore ragged robes and wandered from place to place. In his search for truth, he studied with the wisest teachers of his day. None of them knew how to end suffering, so he continued the search on his own.

For six years he practiced severe asceticism thinking this would lead him to enlightenment. He sat in meditation and ate only roots, leaves and fruit. At times he ate nothing. He could endure more hardships than anyone else, but this did not take him anywhere. He thought, "Neither my life of luxury in the palace nor my life as an ascetic in the forest is the way to freedom. Overdoing things can not lead to happiness." He began to eat nourishing food again and regained his strength.

On a full-moon day in May, he sat under the Bodhi tree in deep meditation and said, "I will not leave this spot until I find an end to suffering." During the night, he was visited by Mara, the evil one, who tried to tempt him away from his virtuous path. First he sent his beautiful daughters to lure Gautama into pleasure. Next he sent bolts of lightning, wind and heavy rain. Last he sent his demonic armies with weapons and flaming rocks. One by one, Gautama met the armies and defeated them with his virtue.

As the struggle ended, he realized the cause of suffering and how to remove it. He had gained the most supreme wisdom and understood things as they truly are. He became the Buddha, 'The Awakened One'. From then on, he was called Shakyamuni Buddha.

After his enlightenment, he went to the Deer Park near the holy city of Benares and shared his new understanding with five holy men. They understood immediately and became his disciples. This marked the beginning of the Buddhist community.

For the next forty-five years, the Buddha and his disciples went from place to place in India spreading the Dharma, his teachings. Their compassion knew no bounds, they helped everyone along the way, beggars, kings and slave girls. At night, they would sleep where they were; when hungry they would ask for a little food.

Whenever the Buddha went, he won the hearts of the people because he dealt with their true feelings. He advised them not to accept his words on blind faith, but to decide for themselves whether his teachings are right or wrong, then follow them. He encouraged everyone to have compassion for each other and develop their own virtue, "You should do your own work, for I can teach only the way."

He never became angry or impatient or spoke harshly to anyone, not even to those who opposed him. He always taught in such a way that everyone could understand. Each person thought the Buddha was speaking especially for him. The Buddha told his followers to help each other on the Way. Following is a story of the Buddha living as an example to his disciples.

Once the Buddha and Ananda visited a monastery where a monk was suffering from a contagious disease. The poor man lay in a mess with no one looking after him. The Buddha himself washed the sick monk and placed him on a new bed. Afterwards, he admonished the other monks. "Monks, you have neither mother nor father to look after you. If you do not look after each other, who will look after you? Whoever serves the sick and suffering, serves me."

Shakyamuni Buddha passed away around 486 BC at the age of eighty. Although he has left the world, the spirit of his kindness and compassion remains. The Buddha realized that that he was not the first to become a Buddha. "There have been many Buddhas before me and will be many Buddhas in the future," The Buddha recalled to his disciples. "All living beings have the Buddha nature and can become Buddhas." For this reason, he taught the way to Buddhahood.

The two main goals of Buddhism are getting to know ourselves and learning the Buddha's teachings. To know who we are, we need to understand that we have two natures. One is called our ordinary nature, which is made up of unpleasant feelings such as fear, anger, and jealousy. The other is our true nature, the part of us that is pure, wise, and perfect. In Buddhism, it is called the Buddha nature. The only difference between us and the Buddha is that we have not awakened to our true nature...□

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- (The writer is a faculty in Logic & Philosophy of Maryam Ajmal Womens' College of Arts, Hojai, Assam)



A critical study the nature of *Pratyaksa* in Nyāya

Junashmita Bhuyan

Pratyaksa is considered as the direct means of internalizing the external world and has been posited in the foremost place in the realm of epistemological enquiry. All the Indian philosophical systems unanimously accept *pratyaksa* as a means of cognition. *Pratyaksa* produces the cognition of an object which is directly present to the senses and one does not require any other means for the cognition of the same object. Hence, it is considered as the basis of all the sources of cognition recognized in Indian philosophy.

The term '*pratyaksa*' consists of two parts; '*prati*' means 'before' or 'near', and '*aksa*' means the 'sense-organ eye'. The process through which immediate knowledge of an object arises or the instrument, by which the object is conceived, is called *pratyaksa*. This word is ambiguous in nature because it is used to connote the result, the apprehension of the truth and the process for the operation, which leads to that result. However, *pratyaksa* originally means sense-perception, but it covers all immediate apprehension, whether through the

assistance of the senses or not. Indian Philosophy accepts this perceptual experience as the primary and the most important means of knowledge (*pramāna*). On the other hand, *pramāna* is derived from valid knowledge i.e. *pramā* and it literally means 'the instrument in the act of knowing'. *Pratyakṣa* consists of an inseparable relation of the perceptive consciousness with its content.

The famous Nyāya philosopher Vātsyāyana says, "When a man seeks the knowledge of a certain thing, if he is told of it by a trustworthy person and has the verbal cognition of the thing, there is still a desire in his mind to ratify his information by means of inference through particular indicative features; and even after he has been able to get at the inferential knowledge of the thing, he is still desirous of actually seeing the thing with his eyes; but when he has once perceived the thing directly, his desires are at rest and he does not seek for any other kind of knowledge."¹

According to B. Russell, "from non-perceptual sources, we can have knowledge of truths, but can never have the knowledge of things."²

It is to be noted here that for *pratyakṣapramā* and *pratyakṣapramāna*, Nyāya uses the same rubric i.e. 'perception'.

According to the Nyāya philosophy, perception is generated when the sense-organ connects with the objects. *Pratyakṣapramāna* is defined as an instrumental cause of *pratyakṣapramā*. For Nyāya, perception is not only the source of our cognition, but it is also the basis of the other sources or methods of cognition i.e. inference, comparison and verbal testimony. Hence it is said that all the other means of cognition accept perception and must be based on cognition derived from it.

Gautama, in his Nyāyasūtras, defines perception as "*indriyārthasannikarcotpannam jñānam avyapadeśyam avyabhichāri vyavasāyātmakam pratyakṣam*."³ This definition simply implies that *pratyakṣa* is a cognition resulting from the sense-object contact which is '*vyavasāyātmakam*' i.e. 'having the nature of certainty', '*avyabhichāri*' i.e. 'non-deviating' and '*avyapadeśyam*' i.e. 'non-verbal.' This *sūtra* is regarded as one of the most remarkable definitions of perception because of the significance of the three attributes used in this *sūtra*, i.e., *avyapadeśyam avyabhichāri vyavasāyātmakam*.

Gautama's definition of *pratyakṣa* comes from the etymological meaning of the term *pratyakṣa*. The derivative meaning of *pratyakṣa* is the functioning or operation of the sense-organs, each in relation to a particular object. Vātsyāyana considers *sannikarṣa* or relation as *pratyakṣa*.⁴ According to Vātsyāyana the process for perception is the connection of the self (*ātman*) to mind and the mind (*manas*) to the sense organs (*indriyas*) and they are getting connected with the object. In this way, there is a relation between *ātman* and *manas* and the perceptual cognition arise in *ātman*.

Uddyotakara defines perception as the type of cognition which is brought out by the sense-object contact. In this connection regarding the term *utpannam*, Vācaspati Miśra states that it is indicative of the fact that the contact of the 'sense' with the 'object' is instrumental in bringing about perceptual knowledge.⁵

Uddyotakara defines that 'perception is that cognition which follows and varies with the variations in the object and appears in a person who has not made use of, and does not yet know the (denotative) relation that the object may bear to any word.'⁶

According to Jayanta Bhatta, the perception of an object may be produced by four or three or two phases of contact, as the case may be. When we perceive the color of an external object, four phases of contact are required to produce its perception. Here the individual soul is conjoined to the internal organ which in its turn comes into contact with the external sense-organ which again is united with the colored substance in which color (the object in question) inheres. The inner perception of internal phenomena such as pleasure, etc., requires two contacts to be produced. External organs such as eyes, etc., have no part to play in that. The transcendental perception of the soul by a sage is produced by a single contact only since in that stage the third object, viz., a subject or an object does not exist besides the soul and the internal organ.⁷

According to Annam Bhatta, *pratyakca* is the instrument or process of perceptual cognition. He defines perception as "*indriyārthasannikarajanyam jñānam pratyakcam.*" Perception is the particular cause of perceptive knowledge and it is the perceptive knowledge that arises out of the contact of the sense-organ with the object.⁸

On the context of Gautama's definition of perception, B. K. Matilal states that "all the Indian thinkers accept that the perceptual cognition should be described as being dependent, in some way or other, upon the senses and Gautama also was concerned with the definition of sense perception and tried to say that one should not confuse a perceptual state, or, for that matter, a cognitive state, with the representation of that state in language."⁹ Generally, the cognitive state of an individual is associated with some words or names. However, this may lead to the natural assumption that there is no cognitive state without language. Further, it might lead us to consider that

perception, and its verbalization is inseparable from, and so identical with, each other. Therefore, the Nyāyasūtras wants, possibly, indicates that sense perception can take place even when the words denoting the object have not been learned- a clear case where someone forced to make a mindful distinction between perception and the verbalization of a perceptual state.¹⁰

It is objected by the opponents, mainly, the Navya Naiyāyikas that the definition of perception given by Gautama is too narrow in its scope hence it is not applicable to the divine perception. So, Viśvanātha comments on the same that the divine perception is not defined by this.¹¹ To avoid this difficulty Viśvanātha further modifies the definition as that is perceptual cognition is that which has no cognition as its instrumental cause.¹²

This definition of perception is first formulated by Gangeśa, the founder of Navya-Nyāya. Gangeśa offers two definitions of perception in his book *Tattvacintāmai*. Firstly, to take the idea of divine or eternal *pratyakca*, he offers his first definition of perception as "*pratyakṣasya sāksātkāritvam laksanam*" means "cognitive immediacy" does define perceptual cognition. The common character of all perception is the immediacy or *sāksātkāritvam*. The perceptions like visual, auditory and other kinds of perception are alike connected with the feeling that something is immediately known by the subject or the knower. To cover the perception of individual and that of Superhuman agency, i.e. God and etc., he offers the second definition of perception as "*jñānā-kāranakam jñānam iti tu vāyam*". This definition implies that cognition which cannot have another cognition as its instrumental cause or *karana*. Perception is that knowledge which is not brought about by the instrumentality of any

antecedent knowledge. This definition is applicable in all the cases of perception, either it is human or divine. Simultaneously this definition excludes other kinds of knowledge like inference, testimony, and comparison.

Keśevamiśra, a scholar from the Syncretist School of the Nyāya thinks "perception is the source of valid immediate knowledge and immediate knowledge is that which is brought about by sense-object contact."¹³ According to him, for knowledge, there is no distinction between what is immediate and what is sensed. In fact, immediate knowledge is just the product of sense-stimulation.

If we make a comparison between Gautama's and Navya-Nyāya's definition of perception, it is seen that the Gangeśa's definition of perception seems to be more acceptable as it hits upon a truth when it defines perception as immediate knowledge, although it recognizes the fact that perception is generally conditioned by sense-object contact. L.T. Hobhouse, a British scholar, also admits this when he says that "the common and essential character of simple ideas of sensation and reflection lies, not in their dependence on any sense-organ, or any special kind of physiological stimulus, but their immediate presence to consciousness. Hence, while admitting that apprehension, in the sense of sensation or perception, is conditioned by both the sense organ and its stimulation and it as the knowledge of what is immediately present to consciousness"¹⁴.

Classification of Pratyakṣa in Nyāya: In the Nyāya philosophy *pratyakṣa* is first divided into two types: *nitya* and *janya*. God alone possesses *nitya pratyakṣa*. All human perception is produced by some causal factors and hence is non-eternal. Non-eternal perception is divided into two types:

Laukika or ordinary and *Alaukika* or extra-ordinary. *Laukika pratyakṣa* is of two kinds, viz., *bahya* (external) and *manasa* (internal). *Bahya pratyakṣa* is produced by the external senses of sight, hearing, touch, taste, and smell. *Manasa pratyakṣa* is brought about by the contact of the internal sense with the internal objects like pleasure (*sukha*), pain (*dukha*), aversion (*dveca*), cognition (*jñāna*), and volition (*icchā*), etc.

Thus, *laukika pratyakṣa* involves epistemic relations (*sannikarsa*) of six kinds, viz., 1. Visual Perception (*Cāksusa pratyakṣa*), 2. Tactual perception (*Śpārsana pratyakṣa*), 3. Auditory perception (*Śrautra pratyakṣa*), 4. Gustatory perception (*Rāsana pratyakṣa*), 5. Olfactory perception (*Ghrānaja pratyakṣa*), and 6. Internal perception (*Manasa*). These six types of *laukika pratyakṣa* refer to the senses concerned in perception.

In Nyāya, there are another two types of *laukika pratyakṣa*, they are *savikalpaka pratyakṣa* and *nirvikalpaka pratyakṣa*. The Nyāya holds that both of these are equally valid and based on reality. This classification depends on the character of the perceptual cognition which arises from sense-object contact. When perception takes place at the very first moment then we don't have the knowledge of an object characterized by any character, however, it apprehends some unrelated elements, and this primary stage is regarded as *nirvikalpaka* or indeterminate perception. This stage of perception is unpredictable, non-relational or uncharacterized. When the non-rationally apprehended elements are differentiated and related in the form of a judgement then this stage of perception is called *savikalpaka* perception- which is relational, predictable and characterized. The existence of the primary stage i.e. *nirvikalpaka* perception is not, however, directly

experienced, but it can be logically proved to exist as a necessary presupposition of our determinate knowledge of the object. In the stage of determinate perception, a thing is ascribed with all its qualities. But to take this substance-attribute relation we may precede the stage of *nirvikalpaka*.

The Nyāya philosophy also recognizes three types of *alaukika pratyaksa*, they are, *sāmānyalakṣanā*, *jñānalakṣanā* and *yogaja*. *Sāmānyalakṣanā* is the perception of a class of objects through *sāmānya* (generic property) found in any individual of that class. For example, when the knowledge of a pot is perceived the universal 'potness' is also perceived. The perception of 'potness' in the present pot serves the purpose of contact between sense and all other pots. The cognition of the universal is the medium of sense-object contact, by which the perception of all pots are possible.

The second type is *jñānalakṣanā*, which is the perception of an object which is in contact with the sense-organs through a previous cognition of itself. For example, when a man says 'I see a piece of fragrant sandalwood', the man not only has a perception of its fragrance by means of his eyes, but he also has the immediate perception of its fragrance. The Naiyāyikas say that our past olfactory perception is closely associated with the visual perception. The present perception of fragrance is due to the revived past cognition of fragrance. This can be explained only through *jñānalakṣanā*.

The third type is *yogaja pratyaksa*. This is the perception for the yogins. It is the intuitive perception of all the objects- past, distant and future, because of some supernatural power.

In short, in the Nyāya epistemology, the term *pratyaksa* is used in two different senses- (i) as the cognition which is the result of a sense- mediated causal process and (ii) the

process itself i.e. the *pramāna*. So, *pratyaksa* as a *pramāna* generates perceptual cognition. For Nyāya, *pratyaksa* is accredited with foremost position as it alone can give us vivid cognition (*viśada-jñāna*) of an object with its properties, while the other sources of cognition can only reveal that the object exists. □

- ¹ Radhakrishnan, Sarvepalli, *Indian Philosophy Vol 2* (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2010), 33
- ² Russell Bertrand, *The Problem of Philosophy*, (London: Oxford University Press, 1912), 46
- ³ Gautama's *Nyāyasūtra* I.I.4.
- ⁴ vrittis tu sannikarsa jñānam va. Vātsyayāna's *Nyāyabhāṣya* on *Nyāyasātra* I.I.3.
- ⁵ utpannagrahaṇena ca sannikarṣasya utpādatvam sūcitam. Vācaspati Miśra's *Nyāya-vārttika-tātparyatīkā* on *Nyāyasātra* I.I.4.
- ⁶ Uddyotkara's *Nyāya-vārtika* on *Nyāyasūtra* I.I.4
- ⁷ Jayanta Bhatta's *Nyāyamañjarī* on *Nyāyasūtra* I.I.4.
- ⁸ indriyārthasannikarsajanyam jñānam pratyaksam. Annam Bhatta's *Tarkasamgraha*.
- ⁹ Matilal, Bimal Krishna, Jonardon Ganeri, ed., *Epistemology, logic, and grammar in Indian philosophical analysis* (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2015), 3-4
- ¹⁰ Ibid., 4

- ¹¹ iśvarapratyakcantu na lakcanām. Viśvanātha's *Nyāyasiddhāntamuktāvalī*.
- ¹² *athava jñānā karanakam jnanam pratyaksam. Ibid.*
- ¹³ sāksātkāripamākaranam pratyaksam, sāksātkārinī ca pramā saivocyate yendriyajā. Keśava Miśra's *Tarkabhāṣā*.
- ¹⁴ Hobhouse, Leonard Trelawny, *The Theory of Knowledge: A Contribution to Some Problems of Logic and Metaphysics* (London: Methuen & Co., 1896), 11

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The concept of Freedom in Existential Philosophy, from the perspective of Sartre

Ashim Chetia

INTRODUCTION:

Philosophers have been pondering the notion of freedom for thousands of years. From Thucydides, through to Thomas Hobbes, John Locke, J.S. Mill and Jean Jacques Rousseau, the concept of freedom has continually been dealt with to some degree in political thought. This is an important concept because we must decide whether individuals are free, whether they should be free, what this means and what kinds of institutions we are to build around these ideas.

Existentialist philosophers such as Albert Camus and Jean Paul Sartre were well known in their time for being involved in resistance, unforgiving of collaborationism and conformity, and for having an active interest in revolutionary movements. When coupled with the fact that freedom is one of the most significant theme that are examined by existentialist philosophers. Existentialism provides a unique and compelling account of what it means to be 'human' which allows for Sartre's conception of freedom to be reasonably developed.

After the world wars, there was a break down in traditional ideas of philosophy. There was no true sense of community, no faith in human nature, and an increasing belief that perhaps the divine did not truly exist, if it allowed for atrocities such as the holocaust to happen, philosophy had to return to its origins, 'what do we know and how do we know it?' was the question. Existentialists answered 'all we really know is that we exist'. Existentialism therefore resolves around questions of existence and the human experience. Existentialists maintain that we cannot know anything if not from our subjectivity. The first and only thing we know is that we exist and that we experience everything subjectivity.

Subject matter:

Freedom, from an existential perspective cannot be separated from responsibility. Freedom is always associated with responsibility. Yet it is common for many people to seek freedom while trying to avoid responsibility, while at times it appears that people may be able to succeed at this, there remains a psychological consequence. This consequence is often not very noticeable; but may find expression through guilt, anxiety, depression or even anger. Existential freedom is often not things as freedom in the political sense. We often think of it. In fact, political freedom could be view to be a rather shallow, though not unimportant type of freedom. A person can be existentially free despite not being politically free, and a person can avoid embracing their existential freedom despite being offered great political freedoms.

For existential philosophers, freedom is seen as a transitory opportunity for self evolution. The seeker of freedom is acknowledging the web of life- limitations, is learning how to apply individual and universal responsibility and lives life authentically. Thus, existentialism's first move is it make every

man aware of what he is and to make the full responsibility of his existence rest on him. And when we say that a man is responsible for himself, we do not only mean that he is responsible for his own individuality, but that he is responsible for all men.

Man definitely thrown into the world and on the other hand, he is radically capable of doing anything imaginable with his subjectivity. Every human being is actually responsible of how he will compose his individuality, how he is going to use his freedom to think, will, dream, project, envision, consider possibilities, invent or create. Nietzsche one of the greatest existentialist philosophers views freedom and the responsibility. It holds as one's own power. The power which makes one to take charge of one's own life and to be creative. For Nietzsche, this responsibility actually brings the realization that one has the power to take charge of one's own life. Even if the individual adopts certain social codes or beliefs, how one acts these values will prove one's unique way to be in the world.

According to another existentialist J.P Sartre, man is totally free but in action. Actions are inseparably tied to intention and so absolute freedom refers to 'choice', 'intention', 'trying and adopting a conduct'. Whether one likes it or not, one must work out his own values and make choices. Even if one has to put off a choice, in fact it is an act of choice. So, there he is condemned to make choices. "Men is condemned to be free". Condemned because he did not create himself, yet in order respects is free, because once thrown in the world, he is responsible for everything he does. "Man is nothing else but what he makes of himself" such is the first principle of existentialism. It is also what is called subjectivity. "Before one comes alive, life is nothing, it is up to him to give it a

meaning, and value is nothing else but the meaning that he chooses"- Sartre. And so, according to existentialism freedom is identical with existence. Freedom is the totality of human existence in one's environment, involving both choices and responsibilities, since a man is always free within his situation to choose the meaning in his life, free to reconstruct his interpretation of experience, free to research and alter then if he chooses.

Freedom for Sartre is not the freedom to do something. He says, "you are free" because you always have a choice therefore choose". But because this creates anxiety and anguish, individuals flee – in – self deception and continue leading inauthentic lives. Man is free when his consciousness acknowledges that something is lacking, when he makes a purpose of himself, and when he commits. In Sartre words, this is when he transcends himself; consequently he argues every action becomes a commitment. For Sartre, existence precedes essence, freedom is absolute, and existence is freedom. Individuals first of all exist, and there is no 'human nature' which exists outside or inside beings. Freedom is therefore limitless, but the physical limitations of the world are taken into consideration. Sartre writes, "no limits to my freedom can be found except freedom itself or, if you prefer, that we are not free to cease being free." However, individuals are born into the world into a 'situation' – this is what he calls 'facticity'. The facticity of human condition involves the limits imposed on the individual by the world. For example, I can choose to jump off a cliff and fly, but I will probably crash because I do not have wings. This does not mean that I am not free- I am still free to choose to fly, but I will have to deal with the consequences of my actions. Sartre writes that freedom means "by oneself to determine oneself to wish." In other

words success is not important to freedom. In 'Being and Nothingness' Sartre explains that we have a responsibility towards our freedom and the freedom of others. An example of this is war- if I am born into a war, I am born into a situation and this situation is what I am. I then have to make choices which I am wholly responsible for. If I choose to fight in the war as opposes to desertion or suicide, I Have chosen to continue this war, and this war becomes mine. This is what Sartre means when he claims that humans are responsible for both their own and others' freedom.

Conclusion:

Based on the above discussion, we have seen that the role of freedom has great significance in existential philosophy. Generally we think that freedom means to do everything having no pressure as we want. But this is applicable in thinking only. Actually although we feel that true freedom refers only in thought, but this not true since we can't think freely for in thinking process also such psychological, environmental and religious factors do impact. So, there is no freedom anywhere. Here we see that freedom is closely connected with responsibility. Just because having a mind to think freely what we want and do whatever we want is not called freedom. It is obvious that we have to accept our responsibility as well as others that Sartre did. Hence, we have learned from this article to keep responsibility along with freedom for others not merely in actions but also in thought.

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Russell on Singular terms.

Debananda Bhattacharyya

Russell's conceptions of singular terms can be studied in the context of his singular proposition. Russellian propositions are complexes composed of the entities they are about. Russellian propositions can be called singular propositions. Russell himself extended this conception of propositions to general ones as well as singular ones. It would thus be mistaken to take Russell to be denying, in 1905, that general propositions contain the things they are about. Furthermore the mistake would lead to a serious misunderstanding of the theory of descriptions for the theory retains the view that sentences containing denoting phrases express proposition which contain the things that they are about. It denies that they express singular proposition. The theory allows these two claims to be asserted without incompatibility by denying that sentences containing denoting phrase in subject position are about the things these phrase purport to denote. The key point to note about this conception of propositional content is simply that singular sentences express propositions containing the things they are about. The semantic contribution made by a singular term is therefore an object-the things it stands for. Russell's semantic theory denies that there is any intermediary sense or connotation between a singular term and its referent.

Russell was clearly motivated to a large extent by epistemological consideration here, and those consideration do not always seem to be at home in a semantic theory. Russell's central epistemological motivation was his insistence on the close relationship between understanding and acquaintance. To understand a proposition, according to Russell, one has to stand in a special epistemic relation—that of acquaintance—to the thing that proposition is about. Thus in every proposition that we can apprehend, all the constituents are really entities with which we have immediate acquaintance. Russell took it for granted that one cannot think directly about an object without being linked to that object by acquaintance. Once that assumption is made it is reasonable enough to adopt the Russellian view of singular terms. There is no room for genuinely empty names in Russell's semantics. For this reason, Russell was led to distinguish logically proper names from ordinary proper names, holding that ordinary proper name are disguised definite descriptions.

The principle of acquaintance leads quite naturally to a Russellian conception of singular terms. However, it does not provide sufficient motivation for a Russellian conception of propositions. A Russellian conception of singular terms need not be arrived at from anything quite as restrictive as Russell's principle of acquaintance. The Russellian conception of singular terms is not only independent of the principle of acquaintance but also independent even of the principle that singular thought requires discriminatory knowledge. This is because one can arrive at the notion of a Russellian singular term by directly considering the semantics of certain expression without being drawn on the issue of what it is to think about something.

Russell, before advocating the theory of descriptions

was influenced by Meinong's view about singular terms. Meinong considered the proposition 'the golden mountain does not exist' as subject-predicate form and its subject term 'the golden- mountain' is a singular term. Thus the propositions 'the golden-mountain 'does not exist' is about the golden mountain that is referred by the subject term. Accordingly Meinong held that we must suppose the being of an object corresponding to the expression 'the golden mountain 'for meaningfulness of the proposition , the golden mountain does not exist'. Similarly, Russell, in the early period of his philosophy considered the proposition like 'the round square does not exist' as subject-predicate form and held that the expression 'the round square 'that occurs in the subject position of the above mentioned proposition refers something. He held that the referent of the expression 'the round square 'is its meaning. However, Russell, in his theory of descriptions rejected his earlier view.

Russell held that proper names are of two types, viz, logically proper names and ordinary proper names and he used the term 'logically proper name' in technical sense. He said that logically proper names are demonstratives like 'this', 'that', etc. which are used to refer to particular objects those are presented to us in acquaintance. Logically proper names are only referring expressions. A logically proper name can only be used as subject expression in a subject-predicate form of proposition to refer to an individual or a particular that is its meaning. Thus logically proper names are genuine singular terms.

Russell thought that ordinary proper names like 'Aristotle', 'Bismarck', 'Napoleon', etc are not genuine singular terms. As they are not referring expressions. An expression to be a referring expression must refer to an individual which is presented to us in acquaintance.

whenever we talk about Aristotle, we consider him as an individual, which satisfies a certain description, namely, the 'the teacher of Alexander'. Thus he held that ordinary proper names are disguised definite descriptions. The meaning of an ordinary proper name is given by a definite description. Moreover, an ordinary proper name has a descriptive function like a definite descriptions. That means that it merely describes an individual, which is apparently considered as its referent. Russell held that an expression with a descriptive content, has only a descriptive function. A definite description has descriptive function and has no referring function. Russell thought that the nature and function of a definite description is different from those of a logically proper name. Thus, no definite description can be a logically proper name.

Russell held that definite descriptions do not refer anything. Thus they do not have any meaning in isolation. They are incomplete symbols. Definite descriptions are meaningful only in the context of a proposition in which they are used. On the other hand, Russell held that a logically proper name is the simplest meaning bearing unit, and the meaning of a logically is its referent for which it stands.

According to Russell, definite descriptions are not semantically simple. For, any definite is composed of these words and these words by themselves have meaning. Logically proper name, are semantically simple. According to Russell, the proposition 'Scott is wise', where 'Scott' is considered as a logically proper name; and the proposition 'The author of Waverly is wise' are not of the same form. □

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